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RECENT DECISIONS
currence is enhanced when, as here, the two are used con-
junctively, without clear distinction.
X0
INTERNATIONAL LAW-FOREIGN DECREE MAY BE EXAMINED
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw.-Farr, Whitlock & Co. contracted
to purchase sugar from a wholly-owned Cuban corporate subsidiary
of Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey [hereinafter referred
to as C.A.V.], an American owned corporation incorporated
in Cuba. Payment was to be made in New York upon the
presentation of the necessary shipping documents. Before the
loading of the sugar could be completed at the Cuban port of
Jucaro, the Cuban government nationalized the property of C.A.V.
In order to obtain the sugar, Farr, Whitlock & Co. subsequently
entered into a new agreement with plaintiff's assignor, a government-
owned corporation, containing the same terms as the original con-
tract of sale. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 977-b of the New
York Civil Practice Act,' the New York State Supreme Court
appointed a temporary receiver for the New York assets of C.A.V.,
to whom Farr, Whitlock & Co. was directed to pay the proceeds
of the sale. Plaintiff, a financial agent of the Cuban government.
basing its claim upon the second agreement, sued in federal court
to recover the sales proceeds either from Farr, Whitlock & Co.
or from the receiver. The District Court, in dismissing plaintiff's
complaint, held it could refuse to enforce a foreign nationalization
decree which was in violation of international law. Banco Nacional
De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
Prior to the instant decision, it was a well-established principle
that the courts of this country would refuse to question the validily,
of an act of a foreign sovereign having intraterritorial effect.2
ingenuity to carry over the previous adequate review when a mb.stantally
identical question had been previously reviewed.
1This section provides for the appointment of a receiver to liquidate
New York assets of a foreign corporation which has been dissolved, liqui-
dated, nationalized or has ceased to do business by revocation or annulment
of its organic law or by dissolution or otherwise.
2See RE, FORMGN CoNriscATIoNs 58 (1951). The "Act of State!'
doctrine, while precluding the courts of the forum from reviewing the
legislative and executive acts of the foreign state, does not preclude the
review of "judicial proceedings of a foreign court resulting in a judgment
if enforcement is sought in the courts of the forum." Id. at 59. Although
foreign judgments are usually enforced on the basis of comity, courts have
refused to give effect to them where they were violative of the public
policy of the forum. Moreover, "foreign judgments . . . have been
19611
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
This principle, known as the "Act of State" doctrine, had its
genesis in the immunity ratione personae3 afforded the person of
a foreign sovereign.4  However, the decision of Lord Chancellor
Cottenham in Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover,' in which
he stated that "a foreign Sovereign, coming into this country,
cannot be made responsible here for an act done in his sovereign
character in his own country .... ,,6 was influential in extending
this principle to include the act of a foreign sovereign, eventually
resulting in the immunity ratione materiae.7  This principle was
expanded into what is now known as the "Act of State" doctrine
by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Underhill v. Hernandez," wherein
he stated that "every sovereign State is bound to respect the in-
dependence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another done within its own territory." 9
In reaching its decision in the present case, the District Court
adhered to the Underhill decision only to the extent that it could
not refuse to enforce the nationalization decree on the ground that
it did not comply with the formal requisites imposed by Cuban
law, nor on the ground that it was violative of the public policy
of the forum. However, it did disturb the sacrosanct position
which the "Act of State" doctrine had enjoyed since Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller's decision in Underhill, by inquiring whether it
could examine the validity of an act of a foreign sovereign under
international law, a question apparently not previously passed upon
by any American court.10 Finding support in the approval of
challenged even in United States courts on the ground of fraud, fairness
of procedure, existence of jurisdiction; and have also been denied con-
clusive effect when there has been a lack of reciprocity." Zander, The Act
of State Doctrine, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 826, 833-34 (1959).
3 "By reason of the person concerned; from the character of the
person." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
4 See RE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 21.
52 H.L.C. 1, 9 Eng. Rep. 993 (1848).
Id. at 17, 9 Eng. Rep. at 998. (Emphasis added.)
7 "By reason of the matter involved; in consequence of, or from the
notice of, the subject-matter." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
See Mann, Sacrosanctity of Foreign Act of State, 59 L.Q. Rnv. 42, 48
(1943).
8 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
9 Id. at 252. Since in both Duke of Brunsuick and Underhill the de-
fendants were representatives of a foreign government, it is possible that
these cases could have been decided by relying solely on the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Therefore, the statement relating to the "acts of
government" would seem to be dicta.
10Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 379-80
(S.D.N.Y. 1961). But see Pons v. Republic of Cuba (D.C. Cir. July 27,
1961) in 146 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 13, 1961, p. 1, col. 1-2. There, Cuba sought an
injunction and accounting from Pons, who, as a Cuban agent, held property
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such action by legal commentators and text writers,"1 and in the
willingness of foreign forums 12 to make similar examinations, the
Court held that it could examine the validity of the Cuban
act under international law.
In so doing, the Court determined that the expropriation of
C.A.V.'s property was in retaliation for acts by the United States
Government and that the use of such property was not reasonably
related to a public purpose.' 3 It further found that the national-
ization decree was discriminatory since it classified United States
nationals separately from all other nationals without any reason-
able basis for such classification. Moreover, the Court pointed
out that although the law pursuant to which the decree was
adopted provided for compensation to be paid in Cuban government
bonds, the condition placed on the payment of interest on the
bonds, as well as the uncertainty of payment at maturity, rendered
the bonds unmarketable and valueless. On the basis of these
findings, the Court held the nationalization to be a patent violation
of international law and refused to enforce it.14
It is not clear whether or not the "Act of State" doctrine
can properly be regarded as a rule of international law.15 If it
were a rule of international law, the District Court in the present
case, by questioning the validity of the Cuban nationalization,
would itself be violating international law. However, it is gen-
erally felt that the doctrine is not a rule of international law,
its application being limited solely to Anglo-American and Dutch
of that country. Pons counterclaimed for the value of property in Cuba
allegedly taken from him by the Cuban government without compensation.
The court, applying the "Act of State" doctrine, refused to examine the
validity of the Cuban act. In an interesting dissent, however, Judge Burger,
pointing out the extraordinary equitable relief sought by Cuba, felt that we
should not "carry the act of state doctrine to the point where we permit a
foreign state to come into our courts as a suitor and secure equitable relief
on a better or different terms than those available to an American litigant
in the same courts." Ibid.
"Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 10, at 380 n.6.
12 Id. at n.7.
'1 See Mann, Outlines of a History of Expropriation, 75 L.Q. REV. 188,
208-09 (1959), wherein the author states: "[M]ore than forty-five written
constitutions . . . make it clear that property cannot be taken except for
public purposes and against payment of compensation. . . ." See also Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 23 (Italy):
"[T]he Italian courts must refuse to apply in Italy any foreign Law which
decrees an expropriation, not for reasons of public interest but for purely
political, persecutory, discriminatory, racial and confiscatory motives." Id.
at 42.
14 Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 10, at 385-86.
's See 1 OPPErHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (8th ed. Lauterpacht
1955).
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courts.1" Moreover, no international tribunal has ever adopted
it, nor is there evidence of any diplomatic protest against a
judicial decision which has failed to adhere to it.'7 Therefore,
it is probable that, as pointed out by the Court, the "Act of
State" doctrine is "a rule of self-imposed restraint . . . [probably
based on] a wise recognition of and respect for the sovereignty
of each state within its own territory ... ." 18
The Court's examination into the validity of the confiscation
under international law could conceivably be upheld on the fol-
lowing rationale. International law is, in the United States, part
of the law of the land.19 As such, not only treaties which are
declared to be the supreme law of the land by virtue of the
Constitution,2 ° but also customary international law which has
received the assent of the United States, are binding upon American
courts even to the extent of overruling previous municipal law.2 1
In view of this, our courts should be free to determine when
an act of a foreign sovereign is illegal under international law
standards, and upon that determination refuse to enforce it. Since
our courts are bound to apply international law, it would not
be a breach of international law to refuse to give effect to an
internationally illegal act. Therefore, the instant decision is at least
prima facie valid.
Formerly, when the property of an individual had been con-
fiscated, his remedies were either to seek redress in the courts
of the confiscating country 22 or to resort to diplomatic channels.
In some instances, the consistent application of the "Act of
State" doctrine has led to unjust and inequitable results 2 where
16 See Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 826, 844
(1959).
17 See Mann, International Delinquencies Before Municipal Coisrts, 70
L.Q. Rav. 181, 198 (1954).
18 Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 10, at 381.
19 See OPPENrEIM , op. cit. supra note 15, at 41.
20 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
21 See OPPENHEIm, op. cit. supra note 15, at 41-42.
22 Resort to the courts of the confiscating state would be particularly
futile in the instant case since it appears that the established courts of Cuba
have been abolished. See affidavit of Dr. Elio Rena Alvarez (former judge
of the highest court in the Province of Havana, Cuba) to the effect "that
there is in truth and fact no laws [sic] in open courts, no forums for judicial
determination, no right of litigation or no constitutional guarantees presently
existing on the island of Cuba. . . ." Brief for the Cuban-American Sugar
Company and Cuban American Sugar Mills Company as Amicus Curiae,
appendix I, p. 3, Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, appeal docketed,
No. 26986, 2d Cir., September 27, 1961.
23 See RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS 170 (1951). See also Bernstein v.
Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
772 (1947), wherein the court refused to examine the validity of an allegedly
anti-Jewish confiscation by Nazi officials. The court indicated, however, that
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these two remedies were involved. However, by virtue of the
instant Court's decision, it ostensibly appears that an injured party
has been given a third remedy in the area of foreign confiscations-
resort to the courts of the forum. But it must be borne in mind
that a municipal court's decree has no extraterritorial effect. Thus,
the remedy offered is only a partial one since, while the court
has the power to award the property within its jurisdiction to the
true owner, no such power exists as to property located outside
its jurisdiction.
But while the District Court's decision apparently gives the
injured party a more direct remedy, albeit only a partial one,
it may have caused more problems than it has solved. The
examination of the validity of an act of a foreign government under
international law would impose upon the courts an added burden,
not only by increasing the volume of cases to be adjudicated, but
also by requiring courts to have a greater knowledge of the rules
of international law. Furthermore, there is the additional problem
that international law does not enjoy a uniform interpretation in
every country.24
Inquiry into the validity of an act of a foreign government
under international law could also lead to the possibility of the
judiciary embarrassing the executive in the conduct of foreign
relations. Since this function is committed by the Constitution
to the political departments of the federal government, 25 the courts
cannot make foreign policy. However, by questioning the act of
a foreign sovereign, the courts could jeopardize the government's
position in the field of foreign affairs.2"
if the executive branch were to give it permission to exercise jurisdiction,
it might do so. Id. at 251.
S4See Reeves, Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law-A Reply,
54 Ams. J. INT'L L. 141, 146-48 (1960). A recent example of this problem
arose in the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's oil field
by the government of Iran. In Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate (The
Rose Mary), [1953] 1 Weekly L.R. 246 (Aden), one of the most noted
cases arising out of that act, the Supreme Court of Aden, departing from
the traditional Underhill rule, examined the validity of the nationalization
and, finding it confiscatory, held it to be in violation of international law.
In two similar cases (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., [1955]
Int'l L. Rep. 23 (Italy) ; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki
Kaisha, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 305 (Japan)) which arose out of the same
incident, the courts of other countries found the decree was not confiscatory.
It is obvious that the confusion resulting from decisions such as these
could have a serious adverse effect on international trade.
25 See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
2r As pointed out by the Court, this possibility does not arise in the
present case since the State Department has expressed its view as to theinvalidity of the nationalization decree. See 43 DEP'T STATE BuLu. 171(1960). But the question remains, what are the courts to do when the
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The weight of authority seems clearly against inquiring into
the validity of a foreign decree when its effect is intraterritorial.
However, the Court in the instant case chose to depart from this
view. As a practical matter, the wisdom of the instant decision
is doubtful in view of the problems to which it gives rise.2 1
LABOR LAw - APPORTIONMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
COSTS-No AUTHORIZATION OF UNION'S POLITICAL SPENDING
OVER MEMBER'S OBJECTION.- Nonunion employees filed to enjoin
the enforcement of a union-shop contract entered into by appellant
union and the employer railroad under Section 2, Eleventh of the
Railway Labor Act.' Union-shop agreements provide for union
membership as a condition to continued employment. The em-
ployees alleged that since the union policy was to spend a substantial
portion of the dues collected for political causes which they opposed,
so much of the Railway Labor Act as authorized union shops was
violative of first amendment freedoms regarding association and
belief. The Supreme Court of Georgia sustained this contention
and the union appealed. Refusing to consider the constitutional
question, the United States Supreme Court held that the sole
purpose of section 2, Eleventh was to apportion collective bargaining
costs among all the benefiting employees, and since political spending
is not an element of collective bargaining, dues collected cannot
be spent for political causes over the objection of a member.
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
According to the union-shop provision of section 2, Eleventh
a union and employer are permitted to agree, notwithstanding state
"right to work" laws, that union membership be a condition of
continued employment, provided that the nonpayment of periodic
dues, initiation fees and assessments shall be the only reason for
refusing or revoking membership. 2
The constitutionality of such agreements was first tested in
Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, which involved an action
executive has not indicated its position on a certain matter or if it were
to change its view regarding a particular situation?
27 Notice of Appeal has been filed in the instant case and it is to be
argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
during the current term.
'Railway Labor Act § 2, Eleventh, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152,
Eleventh (1958).
2 Ibid.
3351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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